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Prior studies have focused on director’s political ideology, their external pressure, financial 
incentives and corporate reputation in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
However, a little attention has been given whether directors’ personal and professional 
networks can influence the CSR performance of firms.  In this study, we investigate the 
effects of director’s network on their CSR performance. Using an unbalanced panel data of 
785 publicly listed firms from 28 countries during 2003 – 2016, we find that while director’s 
professional network positively affects their CSR activities, their personal network, in fact, 
does the opposite.  In addition, director’s network centrality advances the CSR performance 
of their firms. These results are confirmed by addressing endogeneity issue arising out of 
simultaneously determined director’s network and CSR score of firms and unobserved firm 
characteristics that are correlated with CSR score and directors network. Our findings 
contribute to the academic literature related to director's network by providing new empirical 
evidence and a better understanding of the decisions and activities that directors undertake, 
when deciding their CSR and also help policymakers to understand the importance of 
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1. Introduction   
     With the rapidly changing global trading environments, corporate social responsibilities 
(hereafter CSR) have become an international focus towards firm’s strategies related to better 
firm performance (Eberhard and Craig, 2013; Kim, Kim and Qian 2015). Prior studies find 
that financial performance of firms improves when firm’s executives, board members, and 
other financial market participants are connected to each other (e.g., El-Khatib, Fogel and 
Jandik, 2015). Improved firm performance not only provides incentives to engage in CSR 
(Lins, Servaes and Tamayo, 2017), but firms performing better in CSR also face lower capital 
constraints, as high CSR performance is related to better stakeholder’s engagement (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2010). To understand the motivation and incentive for directors to engage in CSR, 
recent studies on CSR have focused on a number of areas such as political ideology of 
executives (Gupta, Briscoe and Hambrick, 2017), gender and family background of CEO 
(Bear, Rahman and Post, 2010; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017), improvement of employee 
behaviour (Flammer and Luo, 2017) and better access to finance (Cheng, Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014). However, existing studies do not investigate the cross-country variation in 
director’s networks with their peers and the impact of these networks on CSR performance.  
    Since, directors of firms allocate a considerable amount of time and resources to their CSR 
strategies (Chen, Wang, and Lin, 2014; Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014), they usually 
associate themselves in a network with external stakeholders (Jacobson, Hood and Van 
Buren, 2014). Therefore, to extend these studies, we draw attention to director’s network that 
influences the director’s effectiveness in their CSR by measuring director’s educational 
network, their current employment, historical employment and independent directors.   
     Director’s networks have a substantial impact on firm’s financial performance (Larcker, 
So and Wang, 2013; Baran and Wilson, 2018; Rossi et al., 2018) which is positively related 
to CSR activities of firms (Lins, Servaes and Tamayo, 2017).  Singh and Delios, 2017 show 
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that director's networks improve access to valuable information in terms of cost, quality, and 
timeliness. Although we find empirical evidence of the impact of CSR and director's network 
on firm performance, no evidence shows the impact of director's networks on CSR activities 
of firms. Thus, in this paper, we examine how do the directors’ networks affect CSR 
activities of the directors?  
     Following literature, we find evidence of different types of networking -such as personal 
connections and professional connections (Ostgaard and Birley 1994; Liu 2014) to examine 
the impact of each type of mentioned network on CSR across countries (Faleye, Kovacs and 
Venkateswaran, 2014; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015). In 
addition, to strengthen our findings, we measure network centrality, which identifies the 
central position within network relationships (Freeman, 1977). Higher centrality enables 
directors to obtain valuable information (Ahuja, 2000) which allows them to anticipate their 
firm’s CSR strategies. Directors with varying background and job profile differ regarding 
how connected they are with their top leaders’ team. Thus, it is important to consider the 
centrality of directors in a network to capture the complete picture of the impact of director 
network on CSR performance. Following, Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, (2007), we use the 
term ‘director’s network centrality’ to refer to the importance of the certain position of 
directors in a network, in terms of ability and contribution that director has within their firms.  
In this paper, we aim to address the research gap by investigating the impact of distinct 
network types such as professional and personal networks on the different type of CSR. The 
existing literature has considered environmental and sustainability behaviour of firms to 
explain different types of CSR (Kim, 2015). Following previous literature, Kim, Kim, and 
Qian, (2015); Pisani et al., (2017), we consider firms’ environment and social scores to 
capture types of firm’s CSR. Environment score refers to those aspects of CSR addressing 
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issues related to the natural environment, whereas social score refers issues related to the 
social environment (Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 2007). 
The financial crisis has revealed a strong interconnection between economy and financial 
market (Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). As CSR is highly related to firm performance, it raises 
questions that how instability in the financial market impacts the types of director’s network 
and in turn the CSR of the firms during the time of financial crisis. Because of an increase in 
the number of bankruptcies during the financial crisis, firms tend to focus on their ethical part 
of the organization (Burlea et al., 2010). 
 Firms’ relationship with the financial sector strengthened during the financial crisis, and 
one of the reasons the relationship strengthened according to Heemskerk, (2013) was to 
support each firm and communicate, which in the long run had a strong impact on director’s 
network. These relationships known as networking has increased the directors’ social capital 
and enabled the firms to raise more capital and achieve higher valuations during the financial 
crisis (Lins, Servaes and Tamayo, 2017). However, there exists a gap in the literature about 
how the financial crisis impacts the directors’ network related to CSR, which we address in 
this paper.   
To empirically examine the impact of director’s network centrality on CSR, we use an 
unbalanced panel data comprising of 785 publicly listed companies from 28 countries during 
2003 – 2016. We find a significant and positive relationship between director’s professional 
network and CSR; we also find a positive relationship between director’s network centrality 
and CSR. However, the relationship between director’s personal network and CSR is 
negative.  We also find the decrease in CSR activities during the period of financial crisis, as 
firms tend to direct their focus towards company’s strategic and management decisions 
during the financial crisis.   
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The findings of our study contribute to the academic literature in several ways. Our study 
adds to the emerging literature on the effect of director’s network on CSR in developed and 
developing countries. We also contribute to director’s professional, personal and centrality 
networks, types of CSR, and to the literature of director's network, CSR, and financial crisis. 
Our study also provides theoretical contribution by recognising inside and outside directors 
and their impact on personal and professional networks.  In a recent study, Jacobson, Hood 
and Van Buren, (2014) theoretically highlight how director’s internal and external networks 
influence CSR. However, the study fails to give any empirical evidence on personal and 
professional director's network that brings financial stability leading to CSR. In addition, to 
our best knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to provide further evidence on the country 
level variation of CSR engagement facilitated by the personal and professional network of 
directors.  Results of this study will assist the policymakers to assess the policies more 
effectively so that they can identify a complete framework related to CSR and can understand 
to what extent they should consider directors’ network’s influence on CSR. Our analysis will 
also guide directors in developed and developing countries to understand to what extent they 
need to strengthen which types of network to diffuse and implement CSR in their firms 
successfully. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, we present a review of the 
related literature, the theoretical model on director’s network and CSR and hypothesis 
development. We then discuss the research methodology employed in the study and report 
the results and robustness tests. In the last section we draw a conclusion about the impact of 
directors’ networks on different types of CSR, discuss theoretical and practical implications 




2. Literature Review 
     Corporate governance (CG) refers to a system by which the firm is controlled and directed 
(Singh and Delios, 2017). It reflects a series of mechanisms through which the interest of 
board directors, management, shareholders, and other stakeholders are set out. A large body 
of empirical evidence suggests that directors are vital in determining factors in controlling 
and directing firm’s operations related to CSR (Ocando, 2017). Firms that create networks 
through a board of directors are a vital feature shaping the organisation’s environment 
(Braun, Briones and Islal, 2018).  A well-connected director has the experience, knowledge, 
and external connections (Intintoli, Kahle and Zhao, 2018) to effectively increase firm 
performance and CSR.  As directors play an essential role in managing firms, their primary 
tasks involve monitoring, strategic decision making, and networking (Zona and Zattoni, 
2007; Francoeur et al., 2017).  
     One of the key matters in networking (Granovetter, 1985) is how a network of connections 
can influence the behavior of directors. Han et al. (2017), specifies director’s network as one 
of the essential connections among firms, which have been proved to be a credible and 
costless channel of information diffusion. Based on this information diffusion function (Chiu 
et al., 2013), director’s network connections can act as an instrument to improve firm’s CSR 
performance.     
     Following Cai and Sevilir, (2012), we define a director’s network a collection of ties with 
all the connections that exist among other directors. These ties can be formed when two 
directors share the same board, or they shared the same board in the past, they sit on the same 
board as independent directors, or they graduated from the same institute. For a very long 
time, networks have been a contentious phenomenon as directors are thought to be 
compromising the effectiveness of the firm by forming different types of networks (Ocando, 
8 
 
2017). It is vital to understand director’s networks who effectively act in the interest of firm’s 
CSR decision-making process.  Helmers et al., (2017), show that the larger the network size 
of the directors, the more likely they are exposed to information and ideas to improve firm 
performance; hence, they are likely to suggest changes in CSR activities of the firm. 
     Prior literature suggests that director’s network ties are crucial information transmission 
channel and it has a direct effect on the diffusion of practices among firms (Han et al., 2015; 
Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009; Haunschild and Beckham, 1998). For instance, Davis 
(1991) claim that when a firm adopts a poison pill, the likelihood of its director’s interlocked 
firms taking the same poison pill will increase.  Another literature suggests that firms are 
more likely to adopt the multi-divisional structure if their interlocking directors have also 
adopted it (Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993).  To summarise, director’s networks is one of 
the most important information channels because it is significant for firm performance which 
then has an impact on firm’s CSR.   
     First time in decade large number of firms collapsed, or some of the firms were bailed out 
by governments due to the global financial crisis (Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2012). 
Motivated by the significance of the global crisis, previous literature has attempted to 
examine the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis (Huizinga; Laeven 2012 
and Balakrishnan, Watts and Zuo (2016). During the financial crisis, directors have received 
attention and have undergone to reforms their structure of boards of directors (Essen, Engelen 
and Carney, 2013). A board of directors is a team of individuals with fiduciary duties of 
leading a firm including during the period of hardship. Therefore, directors are responsible 
for setting a corporate goal of the firms. To ensure adequate performance of the firm, 
directors should pay attention to their networks. The financial crisis highlighted the 
importance of networks for firms and their financial stability (Lins, Servaes and Tamayo, 
2017). Literature makes it clear that director’s networks are essential source during the crisis 
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period. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on which type of director’s network 
effect CSR.  
Theoretical Framework 
     Many theories have been utilised to explain the relationship between director’s network, 
CSR and firm performance. Existing literature has primarily focused on the characteristics of 
the board such as board size, age, and tenure, etc. and other issues affecting firm performance 
such as ownership and CEO compensation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997; Muth and Donaldson 1998; Lausten 2002). This section will review and 
summarise some of the essential theoretical perspectives of director’s professional and 
personal network effects and CSR that are considered relevant for this study: stakeholder’s 
theory, institutional theory, and network theory.  
The research gap mentioned above is explained with the following theoretical model.  
 Stakeholder Theory 
     The theoretical framework is based on stakeholder theory adopted by Freeman (1994). 
This theory explains the relationship between shareholders (principle) and directors (agent). 
Stakeholder theory address how directors perform their duties, i.e., directors should make 
decisions taking in account the interest of all the stakeholders of the firm including CSR, and 
its intimately connected firm performance (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008).  Stakeholder 
theory suggests that the nature of firm's directors and their decisions are relevant information 
for predicting performance of firm's CSR (Brenner and Cochran, 1991; Humphry Hung, 
2011). The goals of a firm is to improve CSR which can be achieved by balancing the 
interests of these different stakeholders such as employees, shareholders to whom the 
corporation is responsible (Freeman, 1994; Clarkson, 1995).  
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     Donaldson and Preston (1995) describe theory in three different perspectives. (1) The 
descriptive perspective where directors empirically make use of the theory to show the steps 
they are taking for the firm’s CSR. (2)  Instrumental perspective is used to identify the 
connection between directors and the achievement of CSR (Heskett and Kotter, 1992). 
Finally, the (3) Normative perspective examines how directors should behave and their 
motivations towards the improvement of firm’s CSR. The conceptualisation of these 
perspectives requires the development of the appropriate research models which we provide 
in this study by linking three perspectives to find influence of director’s network on CSR. 
Directors are seen as important role players to integrate environmental, social, ethical and 
human rights concerns into their firms with the aim to increase the value for their 
shareholders. While previous literature viewed shareholders and CSR aggregated measure, 
there is a strong view that the different dimensions of directors affect CSR such as director’s 
network which we will examine in this study.    
Besides, we apply the following theoretical framework adopted from Waldman, Siegel and 
Javidan, (2006) to strengthen the theoretical underpinning of the research model. 
  
Diagram 1 











     In this theoretical framework model, the authors explain that personal and professional 
network among firm leaders influences the firm's CSR. Similarly, in our research, we are 
aiming to find the impact of personal and professional networks on CSR. In addition, we are 
introducing the crisis period which will help us to extend this existing theoretical model. This 
model is applied to theoretically examine how different types of network explain the different 
types of CSR before and after the financial crisis. 
 Institutional theory  
     Institutional theory (IT) provides a non-economic explanation of firm’s behaviours and 
strategies (Yang and Su, 2014). A firm’s strategic actions may not be free possibilities 
determined solely by economic arrangements but can be regarded as a choice among a 
narrowly defined set of legitimate options determined socially within the organizational field 
(Deligonul et al., 2013). DiMaggio and Powell (2000), explains that an organizational field is 
a set of actors and practices that constitute an area of institutional venue and these actors can 




Organizational fields are quite often well established and highly structured under rules and 
behaviour of director’s.  Melo (2001), develops an institutional approach to analyse collective 
actions in industrial networks. The focus is on how a group of directors develop institutional 
relationships that can support their decision-making process. This literature motivated us to 
consider the institutional theory in explaining the impact of director’s network in our study.  
Deligonul et al., (2013); Anndersen Christensen, and Demgaard (2009) apply three 
institutional pillars and discuss how their institutional environments influence firms from 
different parts of the world and how this influence shapes their expectations within inter-firm 
relationships. They argue that the legal, regulative and cognitive pillars in society can 
influence norms and expectations within buyer-seller relationships. As CSR strategies 
influence the relationship with stakeholders so we introduce the institutional theory to explain 
the theoretical model in our paper.   In addition to stakeholder’s theory we applied the 
institutional theory to explain the impact of different types of networking before and after the 
crisis on CSR. 
Network theory  
     Director’s networks influence economic outcomes for two main reasons: They influence 
the quality of information, and act as an important source to build trust in relationships. 
Network theory (NT) studies show the structure of relationships around director’s or 
organisations and how it affects their behaviours. According to Wellman (1983) and Brown 
et al., (2012) within firms’ networks between directors are vital as it may affect their 
independence and behaviour.  
     The size of director’s network capture by the number of the ties exists within their circle. 
Wegner (1991), describe networks as a dichotomy, as they are classified as either weak or 
strong ties. Director’s tie’s strength reflects the closeness of the relationship between 
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directors. Directors with strong network ties indicate similar background and are in frequent 
contact. Director’s weak network ties characterized as ‘distant’ and infrequent connections 
between directors (Brown et al., 2012). Granovetter (1985), argue that strong network ties 
provide similar information as each tie of network can make marginal contribution to the 
information base. In contrast, weak network ties more likely to be sources of new information 
with higher value to the network ties (Strahilevitz, 2005).  
     Director’s network ties can also be conceptualized as direct or indirect networks (Brown et 
al., 2012). Previous literature such as Larcker (2013); Fracassi and Tate (2012); Cohen at al., 
(2010); Gulati and Westphal (1999), only focus on board’s direct network ties, i.e. directors 
sitting for the same boards. We argue that direct network ties only capture current network 
ties, ignoring the indirect ties such as director’s shared same board in the past. As a 
consequence, the size of director’s network ties is underestimated. Thus, to get a better 
understanding about impact of directors’ network on CSR especially before and after 
financial crisis we strengthen our theoretical model by incorporating NT along with the 
above-mentioned theories.  
2.1. Hypothesis Development  
Directors’ professional networks and CSR 
     Many studies have examined the relation between CSR and financial performance through 
a theoretical and an empirical lens (Adams et al., 2015). The range of CSR activities of firms 
is extensive, i.e., firm may develop products that are made of environmentally- friendly 
materials, work closely with community organizations or donate to charities (McCarthy, 
Oliver, and Song, 2017; Yang and Liu, 2018), which describes and proves the importance of 
CSR in firms and society. In recent studies, CSR has been considered as ‘important' or ‘very 
important factor' of businesses' future success (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). Firms 
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affecting CSR performance likely to disclose their CSR activities (McCarthy, Oliver and 
Song, 2017), which shows their long-term motivation towards environment and society.   
Even though CSR is becoming increasingly significant, research still shows that CSR 
performance by some countries is limited compared to others (Golob and Bartlett, 2007; 
Chen and Bouvain, 2009). One of the main reasons is lack of network within the primary 
decision-makers, in particular, boards of directors who are considered to be the key players in 
firms' CSR achievements (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  
     Director’s networks have attracted growing academic attention in the field of business and 
corporate governance (Renneboog and Zhao, 2014). There is a definite link between 
director’s networks and firm performance (Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001; 
Larcker, So and Wang, 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Benson et al., 2018; Baran and 
Wilson, 2018). These networks are formed through common education, work experience, 
interconnecting board seats, and interconnecting board meetings, etc., which provide 
channels to exchange valuable information (El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015).  Researchers 
find that directors with large network connections have better access to information 
(Fernando Anjos and Cesare Fracassi, 2014; Singh and Delios, 2017).  Thus, we consider 
director network as an important aspect to be examined in CSR related studies.  
Though previous literature finds the impact of CSR and director's network on firm 
performance separately, there are very fewer studies focus on the impact of director's network 
on CSR. Thus, by examining the impact of directors' network centrality on CSR, we will fill 
the existing gap in the literature of CSR.   
     Recently, the importance of CSR is broadly discussed within the global community both 
by practitioners and researchers (Pisani et al., 2017). In developed countries such as US and 
UK, corporate communication in firms is often used to highlight firm’s commitments to CSR 
(Li et al., 2010), improving their markets efforts and enhancing their relationship with their 
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stakeholders. Firm face a variety of demands from their stakeholders, where socially 
responsible behavior is one of them (Freeman, Harrison 2and Wicks, 2007).  
CSR is important for every firm for some reasons (1) it strengthens their relationship with 
their stakeholders (Sen, Bhattacharya and Korschun, 2006) and (2) improve the long-term 
competitiveness and profitability (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). The directors of the firms are 
key leaders to play a significant role in deciding CSR for their firms. For firms to be socially 
and environmentally responsible, directors must work with other directors to exchange their 
information and ideas, to learn different types of CSR.  Although CSR is growing 
significantly, CSR performance is still limited in some countries particularly in developing 
countries (Chen and Bouvain, 2009; Rao and Tilt, 2016). Directors are responsible and 
accountable to a broader range of stakeholders, therefore, examining director's network and 
their influence on CSR across countries is important. Prior studies have mainly used 
environment disclosure and environmental performance to measure CSR  (Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes Ii, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011), but there are only a few studies 
investigating all of the elements of environment and social performance together and 
especially, how different types of director network could influence types of CSR. Our 
discussion to this point makes clear that director's professional networks contribute towards 
CSR. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Director’s professional networks are positively related to CSR  
Directors’ personal networks and CSR 
     Personal networks of directors have been identified as important resources for firms 
(Johannissson, 1998). We consider that personal network of a director with other directors 
exist before the director joins a firm, that is, directors in personal network have studied 
together at the same institute (In this study, we do not consider the other factors for personal 
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network such as ethnicity, language etc.). Through personal networks, directors can attain 
information on how firms are maintained, sustained and developed (Nelson, 2001; Jack, 
2010). Personal networks also open opportunities for directors to enhance the quality of 
strategic choices and reduce the risk of innovation investments (Faleye, Kovacs and 
Venkateswaran, 2014).  In other words, personal network helps in crucial decision-making 
process because people linked in this network can give impartial suggestions and 
information. However, prior studies in the area of personal network document that there may 
be a falling return by introducing new relations (Deeds and Hill, 1996). This type of network 
can provide a variety of resources. But if the firm does not have appropriate absorptive 
capacity, information and resource overload become obvious. So, it can trigger a fall in 
relation with another network (Fombrun, 1982). A number of studies have discussed about 
the structural hole and its impact on network (e.g. Burt 1992). Dodd and Patra (2002) argue 
that personal network can have a negative impact on firm performance through lack of 
structural holes in the network.  
     Institutional theory suggests that where weak institution and underdeveloped capital 
market bring challenges in internationalization of firms, personal network (often informal) 
plays an important role. Luo and Chung (2005) find that family and prior personal contact 
can facilitate business groups’ financial performance. Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 
(2000) describe personal networks as opportunistic, positive and trust building tools. But, 
high level of trust in relationship can be counterproductive, because it can lead to limited 
information processing and consequently firms can lose to identify the best opportunity (Yil-
Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001). However, Burt (1997) argues that strong personal ties 
among directors can hinder creativity and thus have negative effect on firms’ strategies and 
financial performance. In a later study, Musteen, Francis and Datta (2010) show that 
information obtained from director’s personal ties may be inferior in quality to that obtained 
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from professional networks. In addition, Adobor (2006) argues that personal network can 
sometimes be in conflict with the best interest of the firms. So, based on the contradictory 
literature related to personal network, we predict the following hypothesis in relation to CSR: 
Hypothesis 2: Director’s personal networks are negatively related to CSR 
Network centrality and CSR 
     Centrality2 measure is widely used in literature to measure the director's link in the 
network which captures director’s ability to obtain information, command others and 
influences economic decision-making (El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015). These networks 
are formed when they are (1) linked to more stakeholders; (2) close to all other stakeholders 
including peers, and; (3) on the shortest path connecting any other pairs of stakeholders. 
     It is proven that the connections among directors are kind of networks that cannot be 
ignored (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006; Engelberg, Gao and Parsons, 2012; Fracassi and Tate, 
2012; Chen, Wang and Lin, 2014). The behaviour of directors towards CSR not only relies on 
their contacts, but they also get influenced by other directors in their network connections. 
There is an impressive body of existing literature examining the influence of director's 
networks and financial outcomes. Some studies find that connections among directors affect a 
wide variety of business activities (Liu, 2014).    
     Directors’ personal and professional networks include all the directors whom directors 
have direct connections. These connections are significant because it is the main path 
transferring knowledge or information through these connections (Eberhard and Craig, 2013). 
                                                          
2 Three common measures of centrality are: closeness, degree and betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977). Closeness is the inverse of the 
sum of the (shortest) distances between a director and all other directors in a network; it indicates how efficient directors are in a network 
(El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015). Degree is the number of direct ties director have in the network, the more connections directors hold, 
the more central this director is in the network (Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015). Betweenness measures how often directors lie on the 




Their personal qualities such as education and work experience affect their actions while 
deciding about CSR (Jacobson, Hood and Van Buren, 2014). While we measure the impact 
of director's personal and professional network, we also measure positional networks which 
provide a clear understanding of directors are in strategic network positions, giving them the 
power to spread CSR information through their extensive networks with their peers. Previous 
studies show that directors with high centrality (well-connected) can possess many 
advantages in their network, relative to low centrality (less-connected) directors (Faleye, 
Kovacs and Venkateswaran, 2014). The concept of well-connectedness involves many 
dimensions. Firstly, a director may be well-connected if they possess many channels of 
resource exchange, giving them opportunities to share and receives information faster than 
other directors (measured by DEGREE centrality). Secondly, a director may be well-
connected if it possesses closer ties to other directors i.e. there are fewer steps between other 
directors, making resource exchange quicker (measured by CLOSENESS centrality). Lastly, 
a director may be well-connected if it lies on more paths between pairs of other directors, 
making a key broker of resource exchange (measured by BETWEENNESS centrality).  
Directors with large centrality can have better access to valuable information about their 
firms and peer firms (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). This valuable information can help these 
directors to make better decisions while deciding CSR policies, leading to better CSR. 
Therefore, we propose our third hypothesis that director’s centrality has a positive impact on 
CSR: 







3.1. Sample  
     To test our hypotheses, we follow multi-stage data collection procedure using the listed 
firms available from BoardEx and then merge with the CSR data from ASSET4 database. 
Finally, we collect financial data from DataStream for the merged firms. In this section we 
discuss our sample selection in detail. 
     The data for director’s characteristics information are extracted from BoardEx. For each 
fiscal year during the sample period, we collect demographic information on each of the 
firm’s director, including inside and outside directorships they are holding. We also collect 
their current place of employment with their job title and all the board, where they sit. 
Finally, we find their educational history, including the institution attended, the year they 
graduated, and degree earned.  
     Information on networks ties is often missing or incomplete because BoardEx does not 
cover all the relevant directors. To avoid reducing the sample size, we do not drop the 
missing observations. Instead, when information on some network ties is often missing or 
incomplete, we assume there is no tie (Khanna, Kim and Lu, 2015).  We intend to select the 
whole universe of firms reported by BoardEx. However, when we merge our final sample, 
firms with no CSR information reported were dropped immediately. Therefore, after deleting 
all financial firms, our final sample consists of unbalanced panel 9468 firm-year 
observations. In particular, this sample consists of 785 firms with 839 unique directors in 28 
countries during the period of 2003-2016. 
     We draw CSR data from Thomson Reuters’s ASSET4 database. ASSET4 is an established 
source for environmental, social and governance (hereafter ESG) information used by many 
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researchers to measure CSR (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). ASSET4 collect data and 
score for firms on ESG dimensions since fiscal year 2002. ASSET4 database has a team of 
125 analysts to collect information on over 900 evaluation points per firm and according to 
their guidelines, all the primary data used must be objective and publicly available. Then 
these data points are combined into 226 key performance indicators (KPIs), which make the 
basis of the rating process of firm’s three performance pillars: environmental, social and 
governance.  ASSET4 then transform this information into ratings through a system that 
assigns weights of each key performance indicators following several industry 
considerations. To form a firm’s rating pillar, ASSET4 add up the products of each key 
performance indicators and its weight for each pillar. These scores are adjusted for skewness 
and fitted to a curve to derive ratings between 0 and 100.  
3.2. Variable Description 
Following previous literature, Kim, Kim and Qian, (2015); Pisani et al., (2017), we capture 
CSR by measuring environment and social score of the firm.  
Environment Score (ES): The first key pillar environmental scores measures as how well a 
company uses the best management to generate long-term shareholders value (Cheng, 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). We measure ES using ASSET4 environment pillar, which 
measures how a firm uses their practices to generate long-term shareholder value by measure 
the impact on living and non-living natural systems. ES is based on three categories: resource 
reduction, emission reduction, and product innovation, ASSET4 assign a value from 0 to 100, 
with higher values shows better ES.  
Social Score (SS): The second pillar social score shows firm's capacity to generate trust and 
loyalty with its workforce, customers, and society, through its use of best management 
practices and firm’s reputation and the health of its license to operate (Cheng, Ioannou and 
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Serafeim, 2014). We measure SS using the ASSET4 social pillar, which measures how firm 
generates trust and loyalty amongst its stakeholders. SS is based on seven categories 
including employment quality, health and safety issues, training, diversity, human rights, 
community involvement, and product responsibility. The variable takes the values from 0 to 
100, with higher value shows higher SS levels.  
Director’s personal and professional networks   
     We use our fundamental data from BoardEx to measure network connections between 
directors of the firms. For this study, we consider six types of measures to operationalize 
director’s network connections. The professional network consists of current employment, 
and independent directors, the personal network includes education networks and the 
centrality includes closeness, degree and betweenness.  
Professional Networks   
     Following (Fracassi and Tate, 2012), we use our first measure of directors’ network 
(Professional Network 1) by using the current employment of directors. When two or more 
directors work in the same firm and sit together on the same board, they are connected 
through their current employment network. Following (Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda, 2014), 
we use our second measure of directors’ network (Professional Network 2) by calculating the 
number of independent directors in a firm. Three or more outside directors are connected if 
they sit on the same board as independent directors.  
Personal Networks   
     Prior studies suggest that two directors are connected if they went to the same school and 
graduated within two years of each other with a similar degree (Faleye, Kovacs and 
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Venkateswaran, 2014). We operationalize the directors’ Personal Network by calculating 
natural logarithm of number of directors who share same school for similar degree. 
 Director’s centrality networks3   
     We use common measures of centrality from the network literature to evaluate the 
position of a director in the network (El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015). Closeness: 
closeness measures the number of steps that a director needs to take within their network to 
reach any other director. This measure captures the connection to highly influential directors. 
Closeness is defined as the inverse of the average distance between as director and any other 





     
Degree: Degree measures all the direct links that each director has with other directors in the 
network. This measure takes the most information in an account to which a director is visible 
because it measures the fraction of directors to which the director is connected. Let 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗) 
denotes an indicator that directors 𝑖 and 𝑗 share a network,  
  𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖 ≡ Σ𝑗≠𝑖 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗)       
Betweenness:  Betweenness measure the shortest paths linking two directors in the network 
that pass through a director. This measure is most effective capturing the absolute position of 
a director in the network. Let 𝑃𝑖(𝑘, 𝑗) denote the total number of shortest paths between 
                                                          
3 Director’s historic employment can help them to form network. We argue that our centrality measurement can 
capture this fact. The information regarding historic employment information includes their firms in which they 
worked; their roles, role descriptions, and years of employment. 
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director’s k and director j, and 𝑃(𝑘, 𝑗) denote the total number of shortest paths between k 
and j, 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ≡  Σ𝑗≠𝑖:𝑖∉{𝑘,𝑗} 
𝑃𝑖(𝑘, 𝑗)/𝑃(𝑘, 𝑗)
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)/2
 
Firm-specific and country control variables 
     We include several firm-specific control variables that may affect CSR in those firms. At 
the firm level we control for firm size, profitability, leverage, liquidity and Tobin’s Q. Firm 
size is natural logarithm of total assets (Villiers, Naiker and van Staden, 2011; Cheng, 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). Profitability measured by ROE; net income divided by book 
value off equity, Leverage; dividing total debt by percentage of common equity (Walls, 
Berrone and Phan, 2012). Liquidity; net sales divided by the receivable net. We use a sum of 
equity market value and liabilities market value divided by equity book value plus liabilities 
book value to proxy for Tobin’s Q (Khanna, Kim and Lu, 2015) . We employ GDP per capita 
and inflation to control for country control variables.  
      Finally, we measure two firm-level governance measures constructed using data from 
ASSET4. An impressive set of papers considers alternative measures of corporate governance 
and study the impact of these governance measures on firm performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008). Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, (2003), (hereafter GIM) governance measure is an 
equally weighted index of 24 governance provisions, such as, presence of staggered board, 
the existence of poison pills, dual-class shares, whether firm has limits to calling special 
meeting, blank cheque, classified board, compensation plan, voting rights, golden parachute, 
liability, shareholders right, supermajority, fair price provision, secret ballot and written 
consent. G-index ranges between 0 and 24, where higher values indicate weaker shareholder 
rights. Some of the researchers such as (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2004; Bebchuk, Cohen 
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and Ferrell, 2008) found some of the provisions matter more than others; therefore they 
create an "entrenchment index". The entrenchment index (E-index) consists of six 
shareholders rights provisions in a firm’s charter (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2004; 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2008). These provisions are calculated as one point for each of 
the following six charter provision that a firm has: staggered board, a supermajority, golden 
parachute, the existence of poison pills (Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 2011).  E-index ranges 
between 0 and 6, where higher values indicate weaker shareholder rights, similarly to G-
index.  
3.3. Econometric Approach  
     As we have repeated measurements at firm level CSR scores (environmental and social) 
that are nested within countries, a multilevel (panel) data regression analysis is suitable for 
the test of our hypotheses. Multilevel analysis is a method to include explanatory variables at 
different levels simultaneously such as country and firm level (Dong and Stettler, 2011; 
Braam et al., 2015). A major problem of this model is the possibility of firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity, which can be solved by firm-level fixed effects model. We use Equation 1 to 
examine the hypotheses empirically.  
𝐶𝑆𝑅 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅
′𝑆 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐾 +  𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 +𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 +   … … … … … … … . . 𝐸𝑞 1 
     Where Environment Score (ES) and Social Score (SS) are the measures for CSR, which 
are the dependent variables in the above equation. We use director’s professional networks, 
personal networks and network centrality as our main explanatory variables to test the 
hypotheses. In addition, we control for firm-level variables as well as country-level variables 
which are explained in detail. 
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     However, Nickell, (1981) argues that the estimated coefficients by firm-fixed effect model 
can be biased for a short panel length (our sample period is from 2003 to 2016). Furthermore, 
we use few time-invariant country-level variables across firms that makes fixed-effects 
models unusable. Recent studies show that firm performance related to CSR and corporate 
governance are simultaneously determined (Harjoto and Jo, 2011). In fact, the relationship 
between CSR and director’s strategic decision are endogenous in nature (McCarthy, Oliver 
and Song, 2017). To solve this problem, we use two-step system Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM)4 developed by Arellano and Bond, (1991) by including internal 
instruments with multiple lags of all exogenous explanatory variables (Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter, 2012). Our findings are explained below. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
     Table 1 presents the number of firms we have for each country. It can be noted that 
Australia (131 firms) and USA (187 firms) have a very large number of firms compared to 
other countries. Surprisingly, China (3 firms), Austria (1 firm), and the Czech Republic (2 
firms) have only a few firms in our sample, the reason for this could be after we merged our 
data from BoardEx and Asset4, firms with missing observations dropped out. We control for 
outliers by removing countries (Australia and USA) with most observations in our robustness 
section after merging our data.  Figure 1. Shows the distribution of environment and social 
scores over the sample period. About 80 firms have obtained 10 score for environment, about 
55 firms have received 90 score for investing in environment. For social score, higher (55 
firms) number of firms received 90 score for investing in social and lowest (13 firms) firms 
received 10 score.  Figure 2. Represents the mean from 2003-2016, showing firms are more 
interested to invest in social activities. However, the environment and social score have 
                                                          
4 We use Windmeijer, (2005) finite sample correction to the estimated standard errors. 
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increased from 2003-2016, proving more firms are aware of investing in activities related to 
CSR.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
 
     Table 2 gives the break-up of industries covered in the sample. Table 2 shows the 
industrial classification including manufacturing industries such as chemicals, electronic and 
electrical industry, aerospace and defence. Table 2 shows the industry with most firms where 
the percentage is 4.5 or above, for instance, Construction and building materials (44 firms), 
Transport (43firms), and electronic and electrical equipment (41 firms) have the majority of 
the firms. Alternately, Investment companies (1 firm), Legal (1 firm), and containers and 
packaging (2 firms) have the least firms in our sample data.  
 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
       Table 3 presents the descriptive statistic for dependent, independent, country and firm-
level control variables used in the analysis. The table shows that our sample firms are fairly 
large, with the mean of total assets $15.9 million.  
        Table 3 shows the average of at least two directors attended the same institution in the 
same year and attained the similar type of degree. Our results are consistent with Faleye, 
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Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014), but as their study was only done for the U.S and our 
study is on cross country, we, therefore, have less mean values in our results.    
         Table 4 reports the correlations between all variables in the main tests. The correlations 
between personal network and ES (-0.08), and SS (-0.05) are as expected. The environment 
score and social score (0.76) are very high raising concern of multicollinearity. Thus, we 
calculate the VIF (variable inflation factor) for these variables and the highest VIF value is 
3.35, which is well below the suggested limit of 10.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4. Results  
     The results from two-step system GMM are reported and discussed in this section. In this 
model, apart from lags of internal explanatory variables, following Mak and Li, (2001) we 
also include the variable number of inside directors. Based on Hansen test statistics, we find 2 
years lag the optimal lag length of our GMM model. The joint significance of the 
independent variables is confirmed by high F-statistics. Furthermore, the insignificant Hansen 
test (reported p-value) indicates that our models do not suffer from over-identification. The 
use of a dynamic panel (lagged dependent variable) is further supported by significant AR (1) 
and not-significant AR (2). Additionally, we also check the multicollinearity of variables and 
find the VIF of the variables used in our models are below 10. 
4.1 Director’s professional network and CSR 
     Our main results for Hypotheses 1 are presented in Table 5. Hypothesis 1 predicts a 
positive relationship between director’s professional networks and CSR. Columns 1 and 4, 
we show the base model, in which exogenous control variables are regressed on ES and SS 
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(the two measures of CSR). In Columns 2 and 4, we include along with the other variables 
(as Column 1 and 2) and regress the two professional network measures on ES and SS. As it 
can be seen that, the coefficient for Professional Network 1 is positive and statistically 
significant (β = 7.394, p < 0.05) in Column 4 and the coefficient for Professional Network 2 
is also positive and statistically significant (β = 16.237, p < 0.10) in Column 2. This implies, 
on average an increase of one more participant in the director’s Professional Network 1 and 
2, the CSR score will increase by 16.24 and 7.40 unit for ES and SS respectively. This 
indicates that directors use their professional network 1 (formed through their current 
employment) for society and professional network 2 (formed through shared board of 
director’s position) for environment. Overall, these results support the Hypothesis 1. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.2 Director’s personal networks and CSR 
     Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship between director’s personal networks and 
CSR. Our findings for this hypothesis are documented in Columns 3 and 5 of Table 5. In 
these two columns, we regress personal network variable on ES and SS. Note that, since the 
directors are employed to their firms, so their professional networks are still in use in addition 
to personal network in Columns 3 and 5.  The coefficient on directors’ personal network and 
ES is negative and statistically significant (Table 5 Column 3: β = -2.660, p < 0.001). This 
indicates that increase of participants in director’s personal network reduces the environment 
score of the firms. However, we do not find statistically significant coefficient for personal 
network when we regress on SS. This may be because directors can easily get influenced by 
their personal network to invest in profit-making projects rather than in CSR. This supports 




4.3 Director’s networks centrality and CSR 
     In Table 6, we investigate the effect of director’s network centrality on CSR, namely ES 
and SS. To find empirical support for Hypothesis 3, we include three measures of centrality – 
degree, betweenness and closeness in stepwise i.e. each centrality measures at a time in our 
dynamic regression models. The coefficient on degree of centrality in Column 1 is positive 
(although small) and statistically significant (β = 0.003, p < 0.10) and the coefficient on 
betweenness centrality in Column 2 is also positive and statistically significant (β = 79.934, p 
< 0.10). This indicates that the centrality position of directors get support and access 
important information to engage in CSR related to environment. However, we do not get 
support for centrality measures related to closeness centrality and ES. When we regress 
degree, betweenness and closeness centrality measures on social score, we do not observe 
any statistically significant coefficients. The reason can be, the centrality in director’s 
network where the directors form direct links with other directors (of different firms in 
similar or dissimilar firms) is used to improve the image of the firms through taking care of 
environments. However, a number of prior studies shows that the network centrality is 
mainly used to improve firms innovation (e.g. Guan and Liu, 2016; Leanders and Dolfsma, 
2016; Perry-Smith and Manucci 2017, Chuluun et al. 2017, etc.). So we believe that directors 
access knowledge through their centrality position in a network about their competitors 
regarding innovation and spend their earnings in profit-generating projects. So, their spending 
on CSR that improves their social score gets neglected. So, our results partially support 
Hypothesis 3. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.4 Further investigations 
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Director network and CSR activities during financial crisis 
     The global financial crisis led to a worldwide rethinking of their financial system’s 
architecture (Affinito and Pozzolo, 2017). Achieving financial stability and developing a 
well-functioning market have become the most essential to firms after the financial crisis 
(Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2017). Prior studies examine the relationship between firm's 
environment and social behaviour and their financial performance during the recent financial 
crisis (e.g. Cornett, Erhemjamts, and Tehranian, 2016). Having access to social capital 
recourses, it is possible to reduce the negative impact of stressful events, such as financial 
crisis. Directors often seek to take support from their networks when they seek to handle 
economic hardship (Heemskerk, 2013). Based on previous literature discussed above, it is 
evident that interpersonal links likely to affect director’s CSR decision during financial 
distress. Although, Cornett, Erhemjamts, and Tehranian, (2016) documents that CSR 
activities are limited during the financial crisis, but prior studies lack empirical evidence of 
the effect of financial crisis on the relationship between different types of directors’ network 
and their CSR activities. Since our sample period covers the recent global financial crisis, in 
our next attempt we aim to understand which type of CSR activities (environment or social) 
is worst affected by the financial crisis when directors are in a network. 
[Insert Tables 7a and 7b about here] 
     We find that during the financial crisis, while director’s professional and personal 
networks do not have any significant impact on firm’s environment score, their network 
centrality, in particular the closeness centrality increases the environment score of the firms 
(Table 7a, Column 4). For instance, the closeness centrality increases the Environmental 
score during the crisis i.e. increasing the closeness centrality during the financial crisis can 
increase CSR activities by about 6% in terms of environmental score (from β = 17.872, p < 
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0.10 to β = 23.141, p < 0.01). However, Column 4 of Table 7b shows that the increase of 
closeness centrality can decrease the CSR activities indicated by social score by 17% (from β 
= 30.983, p < 0.01 to β = 14.181, p < 0.05). So overall, the CSR activities decrease during the 
financial crisis, because firms and, in particular, directors try to spend  more earnings 
carefully in increasing profit margins than CSR by product differentiation, innovation, or 
improving strategic and management decisions. 
5. Robustness checks 
     This study has conducted a number of post ad hoc tests.  Firstly, Table 2 shows that 
industries such as construction and building materials, electronic and electrical equipment, 
leisure and hotel, mining, and transport have more firms compared to other industries. So, we 
dropped the firms of these industries and estimate the model again. The results are reported in 
Table 8a and 8b. Secondly, by dropping firms from Australia and United States (relatively 
large number firms belong to these two countries), we test the model and lastly, we estimate 
the model by dropping observations from year 2008-2010 (not reported). In all these 
situations, our results stay qualitatively similar, providing support for our predictions.  
[Insert Table 8a and 8b about here] 
5.1. Conclusion 
     CSR has become a key strategic decision for the board of directors as it has obtained 
importance from society and stakeholders that are close to the firm, especially regarding 
environmental and social issues. A capable director should not only focus on company’s 
policies but also motivate others to contribute to activities related CSR. A well-networked 
director provides and receives valuable information quickly and cost-effectively. Several 
studies examine the effect of director’s networks on firm’s outcomes. Most of the empirical 
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studies focus on firm’s financial performance and CSR, to our knowledge, no study has 
examined the impact of different type director’s network on CSR performance.  This paper 
develops and tests the hypothesis that directors through their professional networks have a 
positive impact on CSR, whereas director’s personal networks have a negative impact on 
CSR, showing peers likely to advise more on issues related to strategic decision making.  
          In this paper, we examine the impact of director’s networks on CSR in developed and 
developing countries. It seems that director's networks play an essential role for the 
enhancement of the environment and social performance of the firm, which means that 
directors of firms must pay attention to their stakeholder's relationships that influence their 
behaviour. Especially, those from less developed countries should make efforts to build their 
relations with their peers and convince them to see the importance of CSR in their firms and 
support them for the strategic decision-making process of CSR. Our study finds that 
director’s professional networks have a significant and positive impact on CSR. However, 
director’s personal networks have a negative impact on CSR. Moreover, our study draws 
attention to the impact of director’s networks during times of distress as well.  
     We consider environment score (ES) and social score (SS) separately to find the impact of 
director’s network on CSR in depth. Moreover, we find from our analysis that director’s 
networks affect environment scores (ES) more than social scores (SS). Previous literature 
findings have shown that director's network effect firm performance, also CSR effect firm 
performance (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013; Benabou and Tirole, 2010). However, the lack of 
evidence of the impact of director's network on CSR motivated us to extend the existing 
literature. In addition, we included the period of financial crisis in our study to examine how 
the directors’ networks during financial crisis impact the CSR performance of firms in 
different countries. Empirically we find evidence that director's personal and professional 
network has a better impact on CSR and that director's centrality also affects CSR positively. 
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Even though we did not hypothesize a relationship between director's network and CSR 
before and after the crisis, in series of further investigation, we find that there is a significant 
relationship between director's network and CSR during the crisis. This significant relation 
demonstrates the networks continue to play an important role in developing and developed 
countries even in the financial crisis period. We find that directors that are more central in the 
network are more likely to pursue growth in the environment and social performance.   
     Directors represent the most important shareholders, they know the behaviour and 
performance of the firm better, directors have an interest in increasing CSR related 
expenditure because of their interest of stakeholders and their identity which is affiliated 
strongly with the firm (Renneboog and Zhao, 2014). CSR has become crucial for firms due to 
the importance that it has acquired both in the society and among stakeholder’s groups closest 
to the firm especially concerning the environment and social performance. 
     The contribution of this study has several main aspects. Academically, we contribute to 
the literature of director’s personal and professional networks by demonstrating the effects of 
director’s networking and interaction on CSR. We address the role of each director’s network 
(formal/informal) in each aspect of CSR (environment/social). Our results extend the existing 
literature on the benefits of networks and centrality and show that director’s network 
connections matters in corporate governance. Our results suggest that directors add value to 
the board not only with qualification or previous experience but also with network 
connections they have. We also contribute to the literature on the financial crisis in developed 
and developing countries by demonstrating director’s importance on networking during the 
crisis period.  
     Secondly, the managerial implications of this study relate to firms interested in improving 
CSR performance by having large networks of directors who can influence decisions 
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financially and non-financially. The analysis of this study adds value to directors because it 
points to a specific area related to CSR in corporate governance, as the pressure from other 
stakeholders may be directed to better firm performance, to deal with this, they can build up 
their network to take support from their peer directors. Our results also suggest that directors 
should engage in building and strengthening their networks, and they should utilise those 
networks to drive new ideas to improve CSR performance. Our findings also contribute to the 
financial sector suggesting the lenders (banks) reconsider their decisions while lending loan 
to the borrowers (directors) to directors with their large network as it is proven in the 
previous literature that banks are interested in firms who engage themselves in CSR activities 
(Nandy and Lodh, 2012). The managerial implications of this study also highlight the 
importance of networks in developed and developing countries, by demonstrating that 
directors with such networks have access to more significant and vital information, 
positioning themselves to pursue opportunities both industrial and country level that best 
matches their CSR performance.  
     Previous single theoretical models lead to contradictory findings which we overcome by 
bringing several theories together to explain the research question. Theoretically, our findings 
indicate that most of these directors’ personal and professional networks are important in 
developed and developing countries to improve their financial performance.  We extend 
Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan, (2006), existing theoretical model examining the relationship 
between types of director's network and CSR.  Our study also provides theoretical 
implication by recognising inside and outside director’s network and their impact on personal 
and professional networks. Figure 3. shows that directors working or worked together can 
network inside their firms and have an impact on professional networking. However, 
directors related outside the firm such as education and independent directors can network 
inside and outside the firm, have a high impact on professional and personal networking.  
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     Finally, our study has important policy implications. CSR plays a vital role in the firm’s 
strategic decision-making process in developed and developing countries (Wanderley et al., 
2008), our study will be interest to policymakers because we identify types of director’s 
networking that may deserve regulatory focus to achieve the CSR objectives.     
     Despite several relevant contributions, we are aware that our study has some limitations. 
We find that there is lack of extensive details about director's network, especially in 
developing countries. By looking at other characteristics of directors such as director's duality 
future research can examine the impact on CSR. As we only explained in robustness test the 
impact of the crisis on director's network and CSR, future research can extend this literature 
by finding how financial crisis influence networks and its impact on CSR in developed and 
developing countries. Finally, further research should consider the country level changes in 
corporate governance framework and its impact on CSR considering other types of 
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Table 1: Number of Firms in each country 
 
Country  Freq. Percent 
Australia 131 16.69 
Austria 1 0.13 
China 3 0.38 
Czech Republic 2 0.25 
Denmark 8 1.02 
Finland 12 1.53 
France 37 4.71 
Germany 25 3.18 
Greece 2 0.25 
Hong Kong 18 2.29 
India 63 8.03 
Israel 2 0.25 
Italy 12 1.53 
Japan 56 7.13 
Mexico 9 1.15 
New Zealand 14 1.78 
Norway 4 0.51 
Philippines 12 1.53 
Poland 3 0.38 
Russian Federation 8 1.02 
Singapore 10 1.27 
South Africa 49 6.24 
Spain 12 1.53 
Sweden 4 0.51 
Switzerland 8 1.02 
Turkey 5 0.64 
United Kingdom - England 88 11.21 
United States 187 23.82 


























Table 2: Number of firms in each industry (2003-2016) 
 
Industry Freq. Percent 
Aerospace & Defence 7 0.89 
Automobiles & Parts 23 2.93 
Beverages 8 1.02 
Business Services 35 4.46 
Chemicals 22 2.8 
Clothing, Leisure and Personal Products 18 2.29 
Construction & Building Materials 44 5.61 
Consumer Services 4 0.51 
Containers & Packaging 2 0.25 
Diversified Industrials 30 3.82 
Education 2 0.25 
Electricity 22 2.8 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 41 5.22 
Engineering & Machinery 27 3.44 
Food & Drug Retailers 9 1.15 
Food Producers & Processors 29 3.69 
Forestry & Paper 4 0.51 
General Retailers 32 4.08 
Health 19 2.42 
Household Products 7 0.89 
Information Technology Hardware 14 1.78 
Investment Companies 1 0.13 
Legal 1 0.13 
Leisure & Hotels 36 4.59 
Media & Entertainment 32 4.08 
Mining 40 5.1 
Oil & Gas 37 4.71 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 39 4.97 
Publishing 5 0.64 
Real Estate 18 2.29 
Renewable Energy 6 0.76 
Software & Computer Services 38 4.84 
Steel & Other Metals 25 3.18 
Telecommunication Services 36 4.59 
Tobacco 5 0.64 
Transport 43 5.48 
Utilities - Other 20 2.55 
Wholesale Trade 4 0.51 




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Director's Network      
Personal Network 9134 1.323 1.509 0 4.543 
Professional Network 1 9468 0.247 0.489 0 2.565 
Professional Network 2 6309 0.707 0.142 0.500 1 
Degree Centrality 9468 150.593 317.036 1 2884.000 
Closeness Centrality 9468 0.163 0.116 0 0.355 
Betweenness Centrality 9468 0.035 0.103 0 0.446 
Corporate Social Responsibility      
Environmental Score (ES) 6436 60.337 30.339 8.570 97.460 
Social Score (SS) 6436 63.274 28.876 3.590 98.930 
Control Variables      
G-index 9468 2.534 2.475 0 12 
E-index 9468 0.875 1.009 0 5 
Log (Total Assets) 8881 15.950 2.485 3.219 23.758 
Tobin's Q 8587 2.016 2.659 0.278 173.639 
ROE 7999 14.400 154.588 -2690.260 10400 
Log (Liquidity) 8599 3.965 0.843 0 10.026 
Debt-Equity Ratio 8935 104.858 2113.343 -81371.850 127028.900 
Board Size 6784 11.014 4.082 2.000 30 
CG Score 6436 58.587 27.869 1.240 97.590 
GDP  9468 3.057 3.051 -9.180 15.510 





























Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Personal Network 1.00                   
2 Professional Network 1 0.08 1.00                  
3 Professional Network 2 0.09 0.19 1.00                 
4 Degree -0.01 0.09 0.02 1.00                
5 Closeness -0.31 0.07 -0.03 0.32 1.00               
6 Betweenness 0.43 -0.09 0.00 0.12 -0.50 1.00              
7 ES -0.08 -0.17 -0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 1.00             
8 SS -0.05 -0.17 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.76 1.00            
9 G-index -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.22 -0.18 0.15 0.14 1.00           
10 E-index -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.15 -0.07 0.11 0.12 0.69 1.00          
11 Log (Total Assets) -0.01 -0.22 -0.26 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 0.39 0.37 -0.01 0.03 1.00         
12 Tobin's Q -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 1.00        
13 ROE -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.19 1.00       
14 Log (Liquidity) 0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 1.00      
15 Debt-Equity Ratio 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.04 1.00     
16 Board Size 0.01 -0.23 -0.28 0.03 -0.01 0.19 0.35 0.43 0.07 0.10 0.49 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.06 1.00    
17 CG Score 0.02 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.23 -0.20 -0.12 -0.03 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 1.00   
18 GDP  0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 0.23 0.23 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.20 1.00  








Table 5: Dynamic GMM regression: Effect of personal and professional network on CSR 
  Environmental Score (ES)    Social Score (SS) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
ES (t-1) 0.336*** 0.281*** 0.322***     
 (7.059) (6.376) (8.462)     
SS (t-1)     0.471*** 0.367*** 0.453*** 
     (11.146) (6.564) (11.288) 
Industry average-ES 0.316 0.069 0.100     
 (1.200) (0.338) (0.722)     
Industry average-SS     0.885*** 1.105*** 0.705*** 
     (3.663) (4.995) (4.816) 
G-index -0.616 0.701 0.495  -0.181 -0.067 0.362 
 (-0.703) (0.706) (0.888)  (-0.327) (-0.130) (0.692) 
E-index -0.307 -0.972 -0.681  2.901+ 0.372 2.201+ 
 (-0.140) (-0.550) (-0.530)  (1.940) (0.228) (1.916) 
Log (Total Assets) 2.556+ 3.288** 0.844  -0.918 -0.692 0.154 
 (1.709) (2.728) (1.312)  (-0.637) (-0.524) (0.181) 
Tobin's Q -6.489*** -4.098** -3.480**  -1.358 -1.505 -1.162 
 (-3.410) (-3.007) (-3.214)  (-0.879) (-1.022) (-0.964) 
ROE -0.101 -0.031 -0.098*  -0.058 -0.124+ -0.020 
 (-1.487) (-0.551) (-2.001)  (-1.212) (-1.931) (-0.493) 
Log (Liquidity) 1.685* 0.810 1.154+  1.405+ 2.111** 2.003*** 
 (2.033) (1.120) (1.882)  (1.728) (2.763) (3.518) 
Debt-Equity ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.000  -0.002+ -0.002* -0.003* 
 (-1.132) (-0.889) (0.183)  (-1.957) (-2.166) (-2.316) 
Board size -0.285 0.132 -0.220  -0.017 -0.804** -0.479* 
 (-1.641) (0.495) (-1.060)  (-0.083) (-3.116) (-2.533) 
CG Score 0.506*** 0.298*** 0.246***  0.556*** 0.490*** 0.335*** 
 (6.430) (3.999) (4.529)  (6.797) (5.394) (5.866) 
GDP -0.152 -0.103 -0.116  0.012 0.150 0.292* 
 (-0.963) (-0.646) (-0.809)  (0.080) (0.784) (2.000) 
Inflation -0.104 0.118 -0.014  -0.043 -0.006 0.228 
 (-0.497) (0.473) (-0.064)  (-0.205) (-0.019) (0.954) 
Year dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Professional Network 1  2.262 4.504*   7.394* 3.778* 
  (0.749) (2.433)   (2.377) (2.194) 
Professional Network 2  16.237+ 9.832   8.031 3.559 
  (1.712) (1.319)   (0.658) (0.441) 
Personal Network   -2.660***    -0.541 
   (-3.337)    (-0.939) 
Observations 2831 1678 1678   2831 1678 1678 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-value 0.589 0.630 0.168  0.677 0.515 0.388 
Hansen Over-id (p-value) 0.871 0.299 0.524  0.278 0.442 0.313 
F-statistics First Stage 59.03 41.10 59.85  51.83 30.79 47.41 
p-value (F-stat)  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Two-step dynamic GMM is used. Industry effect is included in all the models. t-statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** 





Table 6: Dynamic GMM regression: Effect of directors’ network centrality on CSR 
  Environmental Score (ES)   Social Score (SS) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
ES (t-1) 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.095***       
 (7.928) (8.966) (6.277)     
SS (t-1)     0.471*** 0.461*** 0.450*** 
     (13.719) (13.579) (12.810) 
Industry average -ES 0.725*** 0.707*** 0.912***     
 (10.643) (11.345) (12.036)     
Industry average -SS     0.621*** 0.538*** 0.669*** 
     (5.111) (4.670) (5.334) 
G-index 0.950*** 0.969*** 0.961***  -0.384 -0.418 0.107 
 (3.578) (3.856) (3.771)  (-0.809) (-0.971) (0.294) 
E-index 0.420 -0.226 -0.121  2.935** 2.103** 2.156* 
 (0.814) (-0.418) (-0.204)  (2.969) (2.616) (2.436) 
Log (Total Assets) 2.560*** 2.844*** 2.852***  -0.514 -0.295 -0.755 
 (7.279) (8.516) (8.496)  (-0.745) (-0.449) (-1.086) 
Tobin's Q -5.261*** -6.102*** -4.817***  -0.961 -1.038 -0.284 
 (-9.077) (-9.097) (-6.364)  (-1.057) (-1.056) (-0.302) 
ROE -0.009 -0.008 -0.047*  -0.013 0.018 -0.009 
 (-0.493) (-0.392) (-1.997)  (-0.379) (0.657) (-0.272) 
Log (Liquidity) 0.240 0.480 0.706  2.400*** 2.240*** 1.982*** 
 (0.435) (0.873) (1.326)  (5.243) (4.798) (4.235) 
Debt-Equity ratio -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*  -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-2.391) (-2.126) (-2.303)  (-3.063) (-2.392) (-2.536) 
Board Size 0.161 0.161 0.103  -0.415* -0.201 -0.309+ 
 (1.384) (1.256) (0.777)  (-2.201) (-1.085) (-1.702) 
CG score 0.446*** 0.460*** 0.466***  0.309*** 0.298*** 0.391*** 
 (19.315) (17.529) (13.204)  (7.021) (6.986) (7.415) 
GDP -0.074 -0.103 -0.005  0.352** 0.319* 0.304* 
 (-0.915) (-1.312) (-0.061)  (2.627) (2.481) (2.507) 
Inflation 0.113 -0.139 0.092  0.274 0.114 0.182 
 (0.746) (-0.940) (0.646)  (1.261) (0.567) (0.851) 
Year dummy YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Professional Network 1 1.929*** 2.548*** 1.346**  2.119+ 2.583* 1.231 
 (5.038) (6.626) (3.299)  (1.700) (1.971) (0.834) 
Professional Network 2 12.621** 14.355*** 10.932*  -2.998 -2.380 5.639 
 (3.099) (3.648) (2.420)  (-0.396) (-0.378) (0.792) 
Personal Network -0.675*** -0.619*** -1.114***  0.161 0.455 0.072 
 (-3.600) (-3.670) (-5.960)  (0.348) (1.145) (0.173) 
Degree Centrality 0.003***    0.001   
 (5.403)    (0.684)   
Betweenness Centrality  79.934***    45.620  
  (4.825)    (0.663)  
Closeness Centrality   -1.155    -2.772 
   (-0.236)    (-0.217) 
Observations 1678 1678 1678   1678 1678 1678 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-value 0.600 0.710 0.639  0.395 0.401 0.441 
Hansen Over-id (p-value) 0.427 0.534 0.462  0.160 0.144 0.137 
F-statistics First Stage 1134.02 829.07 1081.64  56.23 73.99 67.90 
p-value (F-stat)  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Two-step dynamic GMM is used. Industry effect is included in all the models. t-statistics in parentheses.  * 




Table 7a: Dynamic GMM regression: Effect of Financial crisis on the relationship between director’s 
network and CSR. The dependent variable is Environment Score. 
  Environmental Score (ES) 
  (1) (2)   (3)  (4)  (5) 
ES (t-1) 0.138*** 0.321*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 
 (5.829) (8.345) (7.868) (7.856) (8.170) 
Industry average ES 1.024*** 0.124 0.726*** 0.733*** 0.749*** 
 (5.222) (0.857) (10.374) (11.237) (10.896) 
Professional Network 1 1.644+ 4.803* 1.852*** 2.340*** 2.241*** 
 (1.655) (2.465) (4.734) (5.229) (6.373) 
Professional Network 2 17.014* 10.827 13.001** 11.072** 10.930** 
 (2.146) (1.392) (3.119) (2.609) (2.649) 
Professional Network 1 x Crisis 0.805     
 (0.673)     
Professional network 2 x Crisis 1.937     
 (0.369)     
Personal Network  -2.588**    
  (-3.017)    
Personal Network x Crisis  -0.408    
  (-0.394)    
Degree Centrality   0.002***   
   (3.624)   
Degree Centrality x Crisis   0.002**   
   (2.664)   
Closeness Centrality    17.872*  
    (2.098)  
Closeness Centrality x Crisis    23.141***  
    (3.665)  
Betweenness Centrality     160.065*** 
     (6.790) 
Betweenness Centrality x Crisis     -6.128 
     (-0.495) 
Firm level control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Country level control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-value 0.857 0.168 0.601 0.620 0.648 
Hansen Over-id (p-value) 0.537 0.485 0.417 0.448 0.465 
F-statistics First Stage 80.42 58.09 1099.49 927.87 1079.09 
p-value (F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Two-step dynamic GMM is used. Industry effect is included in all the models. t-statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** 












Table 7b: Dynamic GMM regression: Effect of Financial crisis on the relationship between director’s 
network and CSR. The dependent variable is Social Score. 
  Social Score (SS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SS (t-1) 0.062** 0.049** 0.502*** 0.039*** 0.503*** 
 (2.926) (3.046) (14.875) (3.368) (15.201) 
Industry average SS 0.797*** 0.480*** 0.189+ 0.580*** 0.201* 
 (5.739) (6.081) (1.888) (11.589) (1.993) 
Professional Network 1 0.882 1.230* 0.198 1.192** 0.811 
 (1.181) (2.347) (0.134) (2.835) (0.593) 
Professional Network 2 11.171 5.451 -1.168 8.934* -6.903 
 (1.259) (0.878) (-0.156) (2.052) (-0.958) 
Professional Network 1 x Crisis 0.715     
 (0.486)     
Professional network 2 x Crisis -5.671     
 (-0.944)     
Personal Network  -1.158*    
  (-2.577)    
Personal Network x Crisis  -2.216***    
  (-3.769)    
Degree Centrality   0.005*   
   (2.224)   
Degree Centrality x Crisis   0.000   
   (0.328)   
Closeness Centrality    30.983***  
    (4.606)  
Closeness Centrality x Crisis    14.181**  
    (2.838)  
Betweenness Centrality     146.332* 
     (2.198) 
Betweenness Centrality x Crisis     -22.087 
     (-1.438) 
Firm level control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Country level control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-value 0.522 0.418 0.178 0.530 0.200 
Hansen Over-id (p-value) 0.426 0.329 0.304 0.099 0.323 
F-statistics First Stage 13.32 22.56 32.07 96.61 32.18 
p-value (F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Two-step dynamic GMM is used. Industry effect is included in all the models. t-statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** 










Table 8a: Robustness Test 
  Environmental Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ES (t-1) 0.301*** 0.276*** 0.271*** 0.286*** 
 (5.204) (4.797) (4.628) (5.033) 
Industry average ES 0.552* 1.388*** 0.910** 1.165*** 
 (2.493) (4.775) (2.630) (3.754) 
G-index 0.139 1.281 -0.607 -0.079 
 (0.133) (0.991) (-0.488) (-0.120) 
E-index 2.059 -0.692 1.325 -1.540 
 (1.370) (-0.323) (0.431) (-0.746) 
Log (Total Assets) 0.718 -1.572 1.899 1.465 
 (0.664) (-0.741) (0.889) (0.711) 
Tobin's Q -3.031* -3.122 -6.892** -3.562+ 
 (-2.306) (-1.401) (-3.058) (-1.734) 
ROE 0.092 -0.055 -0.002 0.006 
 (1.189) (-0.546) (-0.027) (0.077) 
Log (liquidity) 0.729 0.092 1.934+ 0.531 
 (0.730) (0.083) (1.794) (0.525) 
Deb-equity ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.347) (-0.492) (-0.841) (-0.821) 
Board size -0.014 -0.205 -0.292 -0.221 
 (-0.047) (-0.978) (-1.143) (-1.109) 
CG Score 0.387*** 0.566*** 0.715*** 0.594*** 
 (4.228) (5.546) (6.481) (6.657) 
GDP 0.058 -0.086 -0.021 -0.068 
 (0.394) (-0.462) (-0.102) (-0.359) 
Inflation 0.300 0.028 -0.315 -0.372 
 (0.913) (0.093) (-1.061) (-1.328) 
Professional Network-1 7.802*    
 (2.309)    
Professional Network 2 14.511    
 (1.547)    
Personal Network -3.769**    
 (-2.648)    
Degree Centrality  0.006+   
  (1.764)   
Closeness Centrality   64.016*  
   (2.379)  
Betweenness Centrality    190.332 
    (1.293) 
Observations 1206 2041 2041 2041 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-value 0.332 0.980 0.743 0.795 
Hansen Over-id (p-value) 0.867 0.751 0.767 0.518 
F-statistics First Stage 88.34 46.95 45.85 44.76 
p-value (F-stat) 0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Two-step dynamic GMM is used. Industry effect is included in all the models. t-statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** 










Table 8b: Robustness Test 
  Social Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social Score (t-1) 0.476*** 0.580*** 0.552*** 0.566*** 
 (14.468) (14.269) (14.296) (13.935) 
Industry average SS 0.403*** 0.040 0.109 0.255+ 
 (5.055) (0.244) (0.685) (1.660) 
G-index 0.243 -2.088 -0.344 -0.436 
 (0.596) (-1.611) (-0.304) (-0.328) 
E-index 1.126 2.293 -0.134 -0.128 
 (1.418) (0.924) (-0.061) (-0.058) 
Log (total Assets) 0.626 -2.714 -1.329 -0.203 
 (0.948) (-1.588) (-0.853) (-0.121) 
Tobin's Q -0.668 1.105 2.582+ 2.463+ 
 (-0.819) (0.810) (1.881) (1.759) 
ROE -0.004 -0.046 -0.025 -0.036 
 (-0.150) (-0.900) (-0.565) (-0.669) 
Log (liquidity) 1.910*** 2.148* 1.951* 1.736* 
 (3.990) (2.462) (2.427) (2.029) 
Debt-Equity ratio -0.003* -0.002* -0.002+ -0.002+ 
 (-2.251) (-2.160) (-1.689) (-1.668) 
Board Size -0.525*** 0.027 -0.043 0.156 
 (-3.406) (0.109) (-0.199) (0.578) 
CG score 0.326*** 0.725*** 0.698*** 0.647*** 
 (8.454) (8.488) (8.447) (7.930) 
GDP 0.293* -0.099 -0.107 -0.058 
 (2.480) (-0.572) (-0.664) (-0.359) 
     
Inflation 0.152 0.087 -0.022 0.021 
 (0.784) (0.387) (-0.101) (0.095) 
Professional network 1 4.164**    
 (2.991)    
Professional network 2 5.452    
 (0.870)    
Personal Network -2.456***    
 (-3.271)    
Degree Centrality  0.011*   
  (2.375)   
Closeness Centrality   34.876+  
   (1.669)  
Betweenness Centrality    215.105 
    (1.383) 
Observations 1678 2831 2831 2831 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-value 0.095 0.355 0.264 0.272 
Hansen Over-id (p-value) 0.337 0.825 0.915 0.777 
F-statistics First Stage 222.37 36.39 45.67 45.58 
p-value (F-stat)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Two-step dynamic GMM is used. Industry effect is included in all the models. t-statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** 








Appendix 1. Variable Description  
Variable  Definition  Source  
 
Current Employment 
(Professional Network 1) 
 
CE arises when two individuals working in the same firm in 




(Professional Network 2) 
When firm is having three or more outside directors  Boardex 
Education (Personal Network) Two individuals attended same institute, graduated within two 
years and awarded similar type of degree 
Boardex 
Network Centrality    
Degree Number of directors connected to other directors  Boardex 
Closeness  The inverse of the sum of geodesic distances from one 
directors to other scaled by total number of reachable directors 
in the network 
Boardex 
Betweeness  The probability that a specific director is on the geodesic path 
between any other two directors  
Boardex 
CSR measure    
Environment score Measure company’s impact on living and non-living natural 
systems 
Asset4 
Social Score Measure company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with 
its important stakeholders 
Asset4 
Control variables    
Return on Equity  Net income divided by book value on equity  DataStream 
Log of Total Asset Sum of total assets DataStream 
Leverage  Total debt by % of common equity  DataStream 
Liquidity  Net sales by receivable net DataStream 
Tobin Q Sum of equity market value and liabilities market value 
divided by equity book value plus liabilities book value 
DataStream 
Governance variables    
G-Index  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick index (2003): Defined as one point 
for each of the following six Charter provision that a firm has: 
presence of staggered board, the existence of poison pills, 
dual-class shares, whether firm has limits to calling special 
meeting, blank cheque, classified board, compensation plan, 




super majority, fair price provision, secret ballot and written 
consent 
E-Index  Entrenchment Index as calculated in Bebchuk,  Cremers, and 
Peyer (2007). Defined as one point for each of the following 
six Charter provision that a firm has: staggered board, super 
majority, golden parachute, the existence of poison pills 
Asset4 
Instrument Variables    
GDP per capita Real GDP DataStream 
Inflation CPI Inflation  DataStream 
Board size Total number of directors on board Boardex 
Inside directors Number of inside directors on the board Boardex 
   
 
